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Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text 
 
William Baude* 
 
Abstract: This Term, in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, the 
Supreme Court will decide whether to overrule Nevada v. 
Hall, which holds that state sovereign immunity need not be 
respected in another state’s courts. Overruling Hall seems 
like one more logical extension of the Court’s modern sover-
eign immunity cases, such as Seminole Tribe and Alden v. 
Maine, although those cases have been accused of being in-
consistent with the constitutional text. 
 
There is in fact a theory that explains how Seminole Tribe 
and Alden are consistent with the text. But under that theo-
ry, Nevada v. Hall may well be rightly decided. This Term 
may therefore present a test of whether the Court’s sover-
eign immunity cases will finally break away from the text of 
the Constitution. 
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“I am,” as David Currie once said, “that rara avis, a law profes-
sor who believes that Hans v. Louisiana was rightly decided.”1 Hans 
holds that states have sovereign immunity from being sued without 
their consent.2 And it so holds despite the absence of constitutional 
text that says so in so many words, and despite the presence of a con-
stitutional amendment that seems to pointedly exclude it. The Elev-
enth Amendment gives states immunity to suit in federal court when 
sued “by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any for-
eign state.”3 Hans found immunity even when the suit was by citizens 
of the same state, and hence beyond the text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment. 
 State sovereign immunity has more apologists in the academy 
than it used to – quite a few more than in 1997 when David Currie 
wrote. That increase may owe partly to increased historical evidence or 
increased belief by law professors that the historical evidence matters. 
But it also owes in part to a new way of thinking about sovereign im-
munity – as what Stephen Sachs has called a “constitutional back-
drop.”4 That new understanding explains how sovereign immunity fits 
into the constitutional text and also makes sense of the Court’s sover-
eign immunity cases – for now. But all of that may change, depending 
on the disposition this term of Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt.5 
 
I. 
 
 Sovereign immunity is a government’s right not to be haled into 
court without its consent. Whatever its theoretical provenance, it has 
been a part of American procedure for a long time. Read for all it is 
worth, it might be a bar to nearly all affirmative judicial relief against 
government action. But government officers have long been held to be 
suable in their own right, without the government’s immunity, mean-
ing that in most cases sovereign immunity recedes into the back-
ground.6 
 But sometimes litigants and the federal government are not con-
tent with officer suits; they want to authorize lawsuits against the 
                                            
1 David P. Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 547 
(1997). 
2 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
3 U.S. Const. amdt. XI (emphasis added). 
4 Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1813 (2012). 
5 135 S.Ct. 2940 (2015) (No. 14-1175). 
6 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see 
also Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irrepara-
ble Injury, and Section 1983, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1311 (2001) (discussing tensions be-
tween sovereign immunity and officer suits). 
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state itself. To do that, the federal government needs to trump, or to 
“abrogate,” the state’s sovereign immunity. In a series of cases, the Su-
preme Court has made this very difficult, sometimes nearly impossible, 
for the federal government to do. These cases are a mainstay of federal 
courts classes today, widely criticized by professors and often puzzling 
to students. To figure out whether the cases are right we must figure 
out the legal status of state sovereign immunity. Consider the three 
main positions: 
 Non-constitutional: The first position, probably the most com-
mon one among law professors, is that state sovereign immunity simp-
ly has no constitutional protection at all. On this account, either state 
sovereign immunity was abrogated at the Founding, or else Congress 
is free to “abrogate” state sovereign immunity as much as it likes.  
 On one version of this theory, states forfeited any sovereign im-
munity upon their admission to the union. Perhaps they did so by rati-
fying a Constitution that contained the Article III judicial power, 
which extends generally to “all Cases” arising under federal law and 
also specifically to various “Controversies” to which the state is a par-
ty.7 Or perhaps such forfeiture was simply implicit in the ratification of 
the Constitution itself, which created a new federal sovereign directly 
in the name of “We the People.”8 Something like this was the theory of 
most of the Justices when they decided Chisholm v. Georgia in 1793, 
holding that Georgia had no immunity from an action of assumpsit by 
South Carolina citizens,9 though Chisholm was soon surpassed by the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
 The alternative version is that sovereign immunity exists as a 
rule of common law. And like most rules of common law, it can be dis-
placed by a statute. States might have sovereign immunity in cases 
like Chisholm, where nothing has been done to displace it. But as soon 
as Congress passes a federal statute regulating the state, it can also 
create a judicial remedy under the Necessary and Proper Clause. That 
statutory remedy displaces any common law rules to the contrary. 
Something like this was Justice Stevens’ theory in his dissent in Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida.10 
 Quasi-textual: Those who would deny the power to abrogate 
usually conclude that they must find some part of the Constitution 
that implicitly preserves state sovereign immunity. Currie seems to 
                                            
7 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
8 U.S. Const. pmbl. 
9 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 452 (1793) (Blair, J.); id. at 465-466 (Wilson, J.); 
id. at 467 (Cushing, J.); id. at 474-477 (Jay, J.). 
10 517 U.S. 44, 78-82 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a theory somewhat in be-
tween these two, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 
1425, 1466-1484 (1987) (arguing that state sovereign immunity doesn’t apply if the 
rule of decision is federal law (as in federal question or admiralty cases)).  
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find it in the intent of the Framers without regard to any specific tex-
tual provision. Acknowledging that “it doesn’t say that,”11 Currie 
lumps sovereign immunity with other seemingly non-textual rules like 
intergovernmental tax immunity, the ban on secession, the equal foot-
ing doctrine, official immunity, and executive privilege: “The Constitu-
tion cannot be construed by looking only at its words; history, tradi-
tion, consequences, and purpose help us to understand what the words 
of the Constitution mean.”12 
 Well, that’s one possibility. But several of the other doctrines 
Currie mentions have their critics too, and all of them are an embar-
rassment to those who claim that it is the written document, not its 
penumbras and emanations, that supplies our constitutional law.13 
 Michael Rappaport has argued that immunity can be found im-
plicit in the definition of “state.” The term “creates a strong inference 
that there must be certain state immunities,” and also “is the source of 
these immunities. When the Framers invoked a traditional institution 
or power, they often intended that institution or power to possess cer-
tain of its traditional attributes. By calling the local governments 
‘States,’ the Framers intended that these governments possess some of 
the traditional immunities that states enjoyed.”14 This theory has the 
virtue of pointing to an actual textual provision, but it still requires 
packing a single word with an awful lot of freight. 
 Constitutional Backdrops: There is a third way. Sachs proposed 
that we can see sovereign immunity as a “constitutional backdrop”—
something in between the previous two theories.15 A constitutional 
backdrop is a common law rule like any other, with one key difference: 
some part of the Constitution insulates that rule from being changed. 
Sachs suggests that this category ranges from the trivial – e.g., the 
lawfulness of alcohol sales that took place in 1786 (shielded from 
change by the Ex Post Facto Clause) – to the fundamental – e.g., the 
law of state borders (shielded from change by Article IV and the ban on 
states’ “engag[ing] in war”).16 
 There are different ways to characterize the exact nature of this 
common law rule. Some would describe it as a common law principle of 
                                            
11 David P. Currie, Inflating the Nation’s Power, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1229, 1237 (2004); 
see also id. (“no, it doesn’t.”). 
12 Id. 
13 Cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 430 (1979) (Blackmun J., dissenting) (defending 
“a constitutional source” for sovereign immunity by analogy to the unenumerated 
“guarantee of freedom of association” and “right of interstate travel.”). 
14 Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textu-
al Basis of the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 819, 821 (1999). 
15 Sachs, Backdrops, supra note 4, at 1868-1875. 
16 Id. at 1816-1817, 1828-1834. 
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personal jurisdiction: states simply could not be haled into court with-
out their consent.17 Others would describe it as part of “the law of na-
tions.”18 But either way, it is a form of unwritten customary law de-
serving the label “common law.”19 
 If sovereign immunity is a constitutional backdrop, that means 
that the common-law theorists are right that it is not directly implied 
by the Constitution itself. It’s simply a background rule of procedure 
like waiver or precedent or capacity to sue. But unlike most common 
law rules of procedure, this one can’t be changed, because of the 
properly limited nature of Articles I and III. While this may be the 
least straightforward of the three theories, it is the only one that 
makes sense of both the text and the Court’s sovereign immunity cas-
es. 
 
II. 
 
Hans: In Hans v. Louisiana, a disappointed Louisiana bond-
holder tried to sue the state over its failure to pay a debt.20 This, he 
said, violated the Federal Constitution’s injunction that: “No State 
shall … pass … any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”21 The 
Supreme Court barred the suit, concluding that “The suability of a 
state, without its consent, was a thing unknown to the law,” and that 
nothing about the Constitution had changed that.22  
Under a backdrops theory this case makes sense. The key to the 
case is not the Eleventh Amendment, which Hans unfortunately cit-
ed,23 but rather the limited nature of Article III. Article III’s grant of 
                                            
17 Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 
Harv. L. Rev. 1559 (2002). 
18 James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-
Party Cases, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 555, 582 (1994). 
19 Ann Woolhandler argues that “[e]ven if the Court initially discussed state immuni-
ty as a matter of general law … it likely would have eventually treated the law of 
state immunity as a form of either federal constitutional or subconstitutional law,” 
and argues that “the Court has long handled many other issues of interstate rela-
tions according to rules of federal common law.” Interstate Sovereign Immunity, 2006 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 249, 261 & n. 50 (emphasis added). Under the backdrops approach, the 
label “federal common law” is confusing here. Both sovereign immunity and “other 
issues of interstate relations” are treated as common law, but one must then look to 
other legal provisions to see if those common law rules have been insulated from 
change. Sachs, Backdrops, supra note 4, at 1834-1838. 
20 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
21 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (cited in Hans, 134 U.S. 1, 3 (1890)). 
22 134 U.S. at 16-18. 
23 Id. at 11-12 (suggesting that the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment demon-
strated that “the highest authority of this country,” i.e., the people, thought Chisholm 
v. Georgia was wrongly decided). See also id. at 21 (Harlan, J., concurring in the 
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jurisdiction is defeasible. It establishes the baseline categories of fed-
eral jurisdiction, but doesn’t purport to sweep away literally every doc-
trine of procedure that might otherwise defeat a case.24  
For instance, what about capacity?25 Does the Constitution’s au-
thorization of suits by citizens mean that even infant children can sue? 
Does the Constitution’s authorization of suits arising under federal law 
allow non-human entities, like whales or trees, to attempt to vindicate 
federal rights?26 Maybe, but it’s certainly not a necessary consequence 
of the text.  
And most to the point, what about personal jurisdiction, which 
holds that the case can only be brought if the parties are properly 
haled before the Court? (Recall the theory that sovereign immunity 
was a doctrine of personal jurisdiction.)27 No. The grants of jurisdiction 
are general provisions that are still subject to some of the more specific 
rules of the common law. 
 Hans alone might also square with a generous version of the 
common law theory, since Congress had not tried to abrogate the 
state’s sovereign immunity in that case.28 But about a century later the 
Supreme Court started carrying sovereign immunity further than the 
common law theory could sustain. 
 Seminole Tribe: In Seminole Tribe the Supreme Court held that 
the state of Florida had sovereign immunity from a lawsuit brought 
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.29 And the state had this 
immunity even though federal law explicitly authorized suit against 
the state, and hence abrogated the state’s immunity. That is, the abro-
gation of the state’s immunity was unconstitutional. 
 This is of course inconsistent with the common law theory. And 
under the quasi-textual theory it sends interpreters hunting for some 
word (like “state”) that can be made to imply doctrines like sovereign 
immunity – or else forces interpreters to give up on the text altogether. 
The backdrops theory, however, is consistent with both the case 
and the text: Sovereign immunity is a rule of common law, not a rule of 
constitutional law. But constitutional law sets the boundaries of Con-
gress’s powers under Article I and the federal judiciary’s powers under 
Article III, and those powers do not include abrogating sovereign im-
munity. 
                                                                                                                       
holding) (“I am of the opinion that the decision in [Chisholm] was based upon a sound 
interpretation of the Constitution as that instrument then was.”). 
24 See generally Sachs, Backdrops, supra note 4, at 1863-66, 1870-72. 
25 See 3 Elliot’s Debates 533 (statement of Madison). 
26 Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-745 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
27 See generally Nelson, Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 17.  
28 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 86-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging this). 
29 Id. at 47. 
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 We’ve already seen how Article III itself can be read to leave in 
place the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity. For Seminole 
Tribe to be right, Article I must not give Congress the power to alter 
this immunity either. One could reach that construction of Article I in 
two ways:  
One is to say that Congress lacks the power to add to the juris-
diction given by Article III (as the Court said in Marbury v. Madison, 
among many other places).30 Suits barred by sovereign immunity are 
outside of Article III; Congress can’t add to Article III; presumably it 
follows that Congress can’t eliminate sovereign immunity.31 
But note that this is stronger than the Marbury principle. Mar-
bury said that Congress couldn’t add to the textual categories of Article 
III (otherwise, said the Court, those textual enumerations would be 
pointless).32 This theory would say that Congress can’t even change the 
common-law rules that Article III left in place – presumably that 
means no changing the common-law rules of precedent, no changing 
the common-law rules of capacity, no changing the common-law rules 
of waiver, and no changing the common-law rules for service of pro-
cess.33 That could be right, but it doesn’t have to be. 
 The second, and perhaps more promising, option is to focus on 
the limited nature of Congress’s implied powers under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.34 This may seem counterintuitive: Nobody doubted 
that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act itself was within Congress’s 
power to “regulate Commerce … with the Indian Tribes.”35 The lawsuit 
provision seemed to help enforce the Act, so it seemed to be “necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution” the commerce power.36 But it 
seemed that way only if one thinks that everything that is “helpful” is 
“necessary and proper.” And that’s not quite right. 
                                            
30 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803); see also Mossman v. Hig-
ginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800). 
31 See, e.g., John M. Rogers, Applying the International Law of Sovereign Immunity 
to the States of the Union, 1981 Duke L.J. 449, 455 (1981) (describing a version of 
this argument). 
32 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174 (“Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative 
of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense 
must be given to them or they have no operation at all.”). 
33 I might have added “no changing the common law rules of standing” to my reduc-
tio, except that the Court appears tempted to take that position. See Spokeo v. Rob-
ins, No. 13-1339 (argued Nov. 2, 2015). 
34 It is a neat question whether Congress’s implied powers really come from the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause or whether the Clause is merely declaratory and so the im-
plied powers come from the grants of power in the first place. But the analysis works 
the same either way, so I mention the Clause for ease of exposition to the modern 
eye. 
35 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
36 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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 The Necessary and Proper Clause includes a broad range of so-
called “incidental” powers, but those incidental powers are subject to 
the important interpretive principle that the Constitution doesn’t hide 
elephants in mouseholes.37 Or to put it in historical terms: James Mad-
ison said in opposing the national bank that more important powers, 
however useful, were less likely to “be left to construction,” and that 
the Clause should not be used to imply “a great and important pow-
er.”38 And Chief Justice John Marshall agreed: in upholding the bank 
in McCulloch v. Maryland he conceded that “a great substantive and 
independent power … cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, 
or used as a means of executing them.”39  
 So Seminole Tribe is right under the backdrop theory if abrogat-
ing sovereign immunity is one of the “great and important” or “great 
substantive and independent” powers that falls outside of the implied 
powers of Article I.40 Defining those great powers is a tough question, 
but sovereign immunity seems to be a plausible candidate, in light of 
its deep historical rights, its connection to state sovereignty and (if you 
must) the evidence from the Eleventh Amendment itself that it is the 
kind of power that the Constitution takes very seriously.41 Whether 
Seminole Tribe is right or wrong, the backdrops theory at least makes 
sense of what it’s saying. 
 Alden: If you subscribe to the common-law theory, it’s been 
downhill at least since Seminole Tribe. But if you subscribe to the qua-
si-textual theories based on the 11th Amendment or Article III, then 
the first big mistake would have been Alden v. Maine. In Alden the 
Court extended the non-abrogation rule of Seminole Tribe to state 
courts, saying that Congress can’t abrogate immunity in state court 
any more than in federal courts.42 The great-powers/backdrops theory 
explains why.  
                                            
37 See William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 Yale L.J. 
1738, 1746-1755 (2013); see also The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
(Gary Lawson et al. eds., 2010). 
38 James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (Feb. 7, 1791), reprinted 
in Legislative and Documentary History of the Bank of the United States 39, 40, 43 
(photo. reprint 2008) (1832). But see Robert Reinstein, The Great Power of the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause (Aug. 10, 2015) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2644326 (arguing that Madison’s views were rejected). 
39 M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819). 
40 So far as I know, this point was first made by Nelson, Personal Jurisdiction, supra 
note 17, at 1640. See also Sachs, Backdrops, supra note 4, at 1875. 
41 A related possibility is that the broader category of “coercive power over states” 
was understood to be outside of Congress’s originally enumerated powers, see Brad-
ford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1817, 1851-1852 (2010), perhaps informing the great powers analysis.  
42 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
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 In Alden a group of Maine employees sued the state for viola-
tions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Once again, there was no doubt 
that the Act itself was constitutional – the Court had flirted briefly 
with the view that state employment was outside of Congress’s pow-
ers43 but quickly retreated from it.44 And once again a suit against the 
state seemed to follow naturally from the Act’s substantive require-
ments. And once again the Court said “no.” 
This time, however, Article III and the Eleventh Amendment 
dropped out of the case entirely. Even if you think that the Eleventh 
Amendment should be read to ban federal suits by all citizens, it bans 
only federal suits. Even if you think that Article III preserves state 
sovereign immunity and that Congress can’t change Article III, suits in 
state court have nothing to do with Article III. So what is left to insu-
late common law immunity from change in Alden? 
The answer is just Article I. Once we accept that abrogating 
sovereign immunity is a “great” power, it’s easy to see why abrogation 
is the same in both state and federal court. The immunity itself is just 
a common law rule, so it applies wherever it hasn’t been abrogated. 
The real question is Congress’s Article I power to abrogate, which is 
about the scope of the “necessary and proper” clause and state sover-
eignty, not the forum. Indeed Congress’s Article I powers are no greater 
when regulating state courts than federal courts,45 making Alden fol-
low a fortiori from Seminole Tribe.  
So Alden is not a weak link in the immunity cases but rather a 
keystone. More, one of Alden’s great virtues is that it makes the textu-
al source of sovereign immunity more explicit. It specifically rejects the 
term “Eleventh Amendment immunity” as “something of a misno-
mer,”46 and it instead calls out the limits of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause: 
 
Nor can we conclude that the specific Article I powers delegat-
ed to Congress necessarily include, by virtue of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause or otherwise, the incidental authority to 
subject the States to private suits as a means of achieving ob-
jectives otherwise within the scope of the enumerated powers. 
… As we have recognized in an analogous context:  
 
“When a ‘Law for carrying into Execution’ the 
Commerce Clause violates the principle of state 
sovereignty reflected in the various constitution-
                                            
43 See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) 
44 See Garcia v San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
45 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 Yale 
L.J. 947, 963 (2001). 
46 Alden, 527 U.S. at 713. 
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al provisions it is not a ‘Law proper for carrying 
into Execution the Commerce Clause,’ and is 
thus, in the words of The Federalist, ‘merely an 
act of usurpation’ which ‘deserves to be treated 
as such.’ ”).47  
 
To be sure, not every sentence in Alden is consistent with the 
technicalities of the backdrop theory. For instance, after correctly ac-
cusing the dissenters of a “false dichotomy” and concluding that the 
common-law origins of sovereign immunity do not necessarily mean it 
can be abrogated, the Court analogizes sovereign immunity to a num-
ber of enumerated rights in the Constitution. It went on: “The common-
law lineage of these rights does not mean they are defeasible by stat-
ute or remain mere common-law rights, however. They are, rather, con-
stitutional rights, and form the fundamental law of the land.”48 As a 
matter of backdrops, this is not quite right – sovereign immunity does 
“remain [a] common-law right,” but maybe not a “mere” one. It is insu-
lated from abrogation by statute without quite becoming a constitu-
tional right itself. Still, this is pretty close. 
 Similar analysis, for similar reasons, applies in federal adminis-
trative agencies, as the Court held in South Carolina Ports Authority.49 
Just as Congress lacks the Article I power to eliminate state sovereign 
immunity by forcing them into federal court, it lacks the Article I pow-
er to do the same thing by forcing them into administrative adjudica-
tions instead.  
 Bitzer and Katz: There are a few cases where the Court has 
permitted Congress to trump a state’s sovereign immunity without its 
consent.50 These cases also make sense under the great-
powers/backdrops theory. 
 While Congress cannot abrogate sovereign immunity using most 
of its Article I powers, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer the Court held that Con-
gress can abrogate sovereign immunity when legislating under its 
                                            
47 Id. at 732-33 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (quoting The Federalist No. 33, 
at 204) (ellipses and alterations omitted)). It’s not clear that the Court is right to 
treat “proper” as a separate requirement rather than part of a unitary phrase, see 
Samuel L. Bray, ‘Necessary and Proper’ and ‘Cruel and Unusual’: Hendiadys in the 
Constitution,available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2676347, but it works out basical-
ly the same here. 
48 Id. at 733. 
49 Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
50 Spending Clause statutes can also create state liability, but that is because states 
consent to federal funds and the conditions on them, and for reasons internal to all 
major theories of sovereign immunity, it can be waived. Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 246-247 (1985). 
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power to enforce the 14th Amendment.51 What gives? Some people 
think that the cases are just inconsistent – Bitzer had the good fortune 
to be decided in the 1970s; Seminole Tribe came up after some new 
Justices were on the Court.52 But the modern cases have not cast as-
persions on Bitzer,53 so it’s worth seeing if there’s a theory that makes 
sense of them both. 
 A second theory is that the 14th Amendment trumps sovereign 
immunity simply because it is structurally later in time to Article III 
and the Eleventh Amendment.54 Even on its own terms, that theory 
seems fishy. The Fourteenth Amendment comes after the Fifth and the 
Eighth, but does anybody think it can be enforced through cruel and 
unusual punishments and without due process?55 The Fourteenth 
Amendment comes after Article I, Section 7, too, but does that mean 
the President can’t veto enforcement legislation? (That would have 
been news to Andrew Johnson.) And once we see sovereign immunity 
as a backdrop, we see that neither Article III nor the Eleventh 
Amendment are the source of it anyway. 
 But that leads us to a third approach. The question is not 
whether the 14th Amendment somehow supersedes other provisions of 
the Constitution; the question is whether the 14th Amendment en-
forcement power includes an abrogation power. That means the ques-
tion is whether Congress’s power to enact “appropriate” legislation to 
enforce the 14th Amendment is somehow broader than the powers rec-
ognized under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
That’s a big question, but we can quickly see some ways the an-
swer might be yes. First of all, the texts are different and “appropriate” 
might be a more generous grant of power than the fustier “necessary 
and proper.”  
Second, even if we think the clauses both communicate the 
great-powers/elephants-in-mouseholes concept, they might treat sover-
eign immunity differently under that concept. On some originalist un-
derstandings, for example, we’d presumably ask ourselves whether ab-
rogation was a “great power” – hence, implicitly excluded – when the 
                                            
51 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
52 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 36-41. 
53 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65 (“Fitzpatrick was based upon a rationale 
wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause.”). 
54 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our 
Bifurcated Constitution, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1259, 1269 (2001); see also Seminole Tribe, 
517 U.S. at 65 (noting, without explaining the point, that “the Fourteenth Amend-
ment [was] adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the rati-
fication of the Constitution”). 
55 Accord Currie, supra note 1, at 547 n.6. 
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constitutional power was enacted.56 Because Article I and the 14th 
Amendment were enacted almost 80 years apart, the answer could well 
have changed in between.57  
It’s also possible that what is “great” is context-sensitive. For in-
stance, the generally-great power of eminent domain may have been 
implied by Congress’s military powers, but no others.58 On this theory, 
because the Fourteenth Amendment directly confronts and constrains 
state power, it’s less surprising for it to implicitly authorize abroga-
tions of state sovereignty.59 
The Supreme Court also held, in Central Virginia Community 
College v. Katz, that Congress may authorize jurisdiction over states 
when using its Article I bankruptcy power.60 This is different from eve-
ry other Article I power the Court has confronted. The argument for 
inconsistency seems stronger here, since the case was decided recently 
and only one Justice – Justice O’Connor – is responsible for the 
changed outcome. 
 But Katz’s correctness is also consistent with – if orthogonal to – 
the great-powers/backdrops theory. Indeed, Katz concluded that the 
case didn’t really implicate the abrogation power.61 That was partly be-
cause “[b]ankruptcy jurisdiction, at its core, is in rem” and thus “does 
not implicate States’ sovereignty to nearly the same degree as other 
kinds of jurisdiction.”62 And partly because the particular structure 
and history of bankruptcy law—including specific bankruptcy cases 
and statutes at and immediately after the Founding—suggested that 
states had “agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert” their 
sovereign immunity.63 This conclusion allowed the Katz Court to side-
                                            
56 Baude, Eminent Domain, supra note 37, at 1811 n.407.  
57 John Harrison argues that as an actual historical matter this isn’t the case, but 
doesn’t question the theory. John Harrison, State Sovereign Immunity and Con-
gress’s Enforcement Powers, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 353, 354-69; see also John E. Nowak, 
The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Govern-
ments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1413, 1454 (1975). 
58 Baude, Eminent Domain, supra note 37, at 1799-1800. But see Saikrishna Banga-
lore Prakash, The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 
1337, 1345 n. 43 (2015) (inferring from the history of military takings a more general 
takings power). 
59 Similarly, because the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly regulates the states and 
authorizes congressional enforcement of those provisions, it seems to authorize coer-
cion of the states even if the Article I powers do not. Clark, supra note 41, at 1917.  
60 546 U.S. 356 (2006). 
61 Cf. Katz, 546 U.S. at 361-62 (concluding that “Congress’ attempt to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity in 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) ... was not necessary to authorize the 
Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction.”).  
62 Id. at 362. 
63 Id. at 373. 
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step the usual disputes about the status of sovereign immunity and the 
power to abrogate it.64  
 Theories that put sovereign immunity directly into the text or 
structure of the Constitution have a hard time explaining why differ-
ent powers would relate to it differently. Theories that treat it as a 
backdrop – just a common law rule – can explain this, because they fo-
cus on the source of the power to abrogate. It’s therefore little surprise 
if different powers have … different powers. 
 
III. 
 
 But there’s one last piece of the puzzle. What about sovereign 
immunity in the courts of another state? In Nevada v. Hall, decided in 
1979, the Supreme Court held that states do not have immunity in 
each other’s courts.65 This seems like an exception to the general pat-
tern of immunity and has been criticized as an anomaly in the doc-
trine.66 Indeed, many people have wondered whether Alden v. Maine 
can coherently be distinguished from Nevada v. Hall.67 
What is more, it appears that some members of the Court agree 
and are out to correct the anomaly. In Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 
argued this term, the Court granted certiorari to decide whether Neva-
da v. Hall should be overruled.68 To ask the question is to suggest the 
answer might be “yes.” And indeed, at oral argument the Justices 
seemed prepared to overrule Hall, thus extending sovereign immunity 
to state courts. 
Part of Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Hall rested on a 
distinction between “two quite different concepts, one applicable to 
suits in the sovereign’s own courts and the other to suits in the courts 
of another sovereign.”69 Immunity in one’s own courts, the Court wrote, 
“has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries,” while 
immunity in another sovereign’s courts was a matter of mutual agree-
ment or comity.”70  
                                            
64 As with Bitzer, supra note 57, one might well think the Court misinterpreted the 
specific history of the Bankruptcy Clause or that it simply reflected Justice 
O’Connor’s cold feet. But the theory of Katz still remains consistent with the general 
great-powers/backdrops approach that underlies the other cases. 
65 440 U.S. 410 (1979). 
66 Woolhandler, supra note 19, at 250-51. 
67 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, David L. 
Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 975-976 (7th 
ed. 2015). 
68 See 135 S.Ct. 2940 (2015) (Mem). 
69 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 414. 
70 Id. at 416. 
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This distinction might indeed distinguish Alden, which featured 
a state’s own courts, but it still leaves Hall harder to reconcile with 
Seminole Tribe, which protected sovereign immunity in the “courts of 
another sovereign” – the federal government. But even if one lumps 
these two kinds of sovereign immunity together,71 there is another way 
to approach Hall: the backdrops theory, which seems to be the best ac-
count of the Court’s cases so far. 
The backdrops theory suggests that the two cases are quite dis-
tinguishable. As the reader will by now understand, in every backdrop 
case there are really two questions: First, is there a common-law rule? 
Second, how much has it been insulated from change? And in the mod-
ern sovereign immunity cases the key question is usually the second 
one, which usually reduces to what is the power to abrogate?  
It is the answer to that second question that potentially distin-
guishes Alden from Hall and Franchise Tax Board. The federal gov-
ernment’s powers are pervasively limited by the Constitution. When 
Congress tries to abrogate immunity in federal court, it’s limited by the 
scope of Articles I and III. When Congress tries to abrogate immunity 
in state court, it’s limited by the scope of Article I. But in Franchise 
Tax Board, the attempted abrogation has come from the state of Neva-
da. So the question is: what part of the Constitution limits state au-
thority to abrogate? The Constitution doesn’t limit states to enumerat-
ed powers and imposes relatively few constraints on their treatment of 
one another.72  
Yes, the states must give “Full Faith and Credit … to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State,”73 but 
nothing in this clause requires them to award other states sovereign 
immunity. At oral argument Justice Breyer toyed with using the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause to restrict state abrogation,74 but the Court’s 
previous cases have read the Clause to give a state broad discretion to 
choose to apply its own law to a controversy,75 and the original mean-
ing of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is probably more deferential 
                                            
71 For an argument that the two immunities should be distinguished, and are distin-
guished by some of the Court’s cases, see Brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt (No. 14-1175). 
72 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 739 (distinguishing Hall because “The Constitution, after 
all, treats the powers of the States differently from the powers of the Federal Gov-
ernment.”). 
73 U.S. Const. art. IV, sec 1. 
74 Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-19, Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 135 S.Ct. 
2940 (2015) (No. 14-1175). 
75 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313(1981); Franchise Tax Bd. of 
California v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494-499 (2003). 
Working paper: Jan. 12, 2016 
 
15 
 
still.76 This rationale would be an even bigger change to the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause than to sovereign immunity. 
The states are also forbidden by the Constitution to “engage in 
War, unless actually invaded or in such imminent Danger as will not 
admit of delay.”77 It’s not inconceivable that this clause could limit 
state abrogation authority, though it seems like a stretch. Treating ab-
rogation as a form of war would also have odd effects on other sover-
eign immunity jurisprudence, such as the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act.78 And it also might oddly suggest that Congress has an Article 
I abrogation power after all, thanks to its own power to “declare 
War.”79 
In the leading critique of Nevada v. Hall, Ann Woolhandler sug-
gests that states ability to sue one another was instead implicitly disa-
bled by Article III: its “provision for state/citizen diversity and the orig-
inal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in state-as-party cases meant 
that any aboriginal power in the state courts to hold each other invol-
untarily liable to individuals’ suits had been ceded to the federal 
courts.”80 But if Article III did not strip states’ pre-existing immunities, 
despite creating jurisdiction over states, it seems even more unlikely 
that it implicitly stripped their pre-existing power to abrogate those 
immunities, despite saying nothing about it. 
Finally, and most speculatively, one could hold state sovereign 
immunity beyond other states’ power to abrogate through a somewhat 
complicated theory of international law. If one believes (1) that sover-
eign immunity was part of the law of nations,81 (2) that states lack the 
power to enact statutes that violate the law of nations (even when 
there is no treaty or federal law embodying them),82 and (3) that both 
these rules carry over to the interstate context, then one might con-
clude that states lack the power to abrogate one another’s sovereign 
immunity. These limitations also take us well beyond the text, since 
the Constitution never says that states can’t violate international 
                                            
76 David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 Yale L.J. 1584, 1632, 
1655 (2009); see also Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 
95 Va. L. Rev. 1201, 1208, 1230-1231 (2009). 
77 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. 
78 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11. 
79 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
80 Woolhandler, supra note 19, at 265. 
81 See Pfander, supra note 18. 
82 Compare Pfander, supra note 18, at 582 n. 102, with Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Brad-
ford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 25 n. 99 
(2009); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as 
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 
(1997). 
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law,83 especially interstate international law (if there is such a thing), 
but at least they would maintain the structure of the current back-
drops approach – by focusing on the question of the power to abrogate, 
not trying to elevate the common-law principle of sovereign immunity 
to an unenumerated constitutional right.84 
If, as seems most likely, there are no limits on the state power to 
abrogate other states’ immunity, then the Court should leave Nevada 
v. Hall in place. This would recognize sovereign immunity as a com-
mon law rule – part of the common law or law of nations background 
before the ratification of the Constitution – but one that states can still 
abrogate. Just as states can abrogate the common law rules of privity, 
and indeed just as states can (likely) abrogate customary international 
law, states can abrogate the common law rule of sovereign immunity. 
That might be a bad idea, but the Constitution lets states do lots of 
things that are bad ideas. 
 
IV. 
 
 Counsel for the Franchise Tax Board repeatedly stressed that to 
allow immunity to be abrogated in the courts of other states would cre-
ate a practical and historical anomaly: “I mean, Chisholm can’t sue 
Georgia in a perfectly neutral Federal court; Chisholm can’t sue Geor-
gia in Georgia court; but Chisholm can sue Georgia in the l[e]ast neu-
tral court available, the State of South Carolina. That doesn’t make 
any sense.”85 But this argument assumes that the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity is the only rule of procedure that protects state interests. 
That isn’t so. 
For instance, the fact that Nevada courts can hear a claim 
against California does not necessarily mean that Mr. Hyatt will actu-
ally be able to collect his money. Once the Nevada courts issue a judg-
ment, it still needs to be enforced. To be sure, if the Tax Board has its 
own assets in Nevada, or if the Tax Board later wants to go after Hyatt 
in Nevada, a Nevada judgment may award him all the relief he seeks. 
But if the California Franchise Tax Board doesn’t have massive assets 
in Nevada, then Hyatt will have to collect somewhere else, like Cali-
                                            
83 See Michael D. Ramsey, The Constitution's Text in Foreign Affairs 348-355 (2007) 
(making textual argument); but see Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International 
Law As U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and A 
Defense of the Modern Position, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1495, 1519-20 (2011) (argu-
ing that “the text neither establishes nor rebuts the modern position”). 
84 The same is true of Woolhandler’s suggestion that “[e]ven if” sovereign immunity is 
a form of common law, it should be seen as “federal common law, and … not subject 
to change by the legislative power of any individual state.” Woolhandler, supra note 
19, at 266 n. 59. 
85 Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, supra note 74. 
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fornia. Having abrogated California’s sovereign immunity in Nevada, 
the state might discover that its judgments encounter serious legal and 
practical obstacles elsewhere.86 
 More generally, maintaining the rule of Nevada v. Hall means 
that solutions to some interstate conflicts will have to be found outside 
of the law of sovereign immunity – such as in the law of judgments, di-
versity jurisdiction, and so on.87 Those are important challenges for 
both constitutional law and conflicts of law. But the most important 
question at issue in Franchise Tax Board is not the fate of Hyatt’s 
judgment, or even the fate of interstate tax conflicts. It is whether the 
Court will cast away the best modern account of state sovereign im-
munity.  
                                            
86 Steve Sachs is responsible for every good idea in this paragraph. 
87 See also Wooldhandler at 266-272 (discussing possible limits on judgment enforce-
ment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
